Abstract-Several recent incidents have clearly illustrated the susceptibility of cyberphysical systems (CPS) to attacks, raising attention to security challenges in these systems. The tight interaction between information technology and the physical world has introduced new vulnerabilities that cannot be addressed with the use of standard cryptographic security techniques. Accordingly, the problem of state estimation in the presence of sensor and actuator attacks has attracted significant attention in the past. Unlike the existing work, in this paper, we consider the problem of attackresilient state estimation in the presence of bounded-size noise. We focus on the most general model for sensor attacks where any signal can be injected via compromised sensors. Specifically, we present an l 0 -based state estimator that can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program and its convex relaxation based on the l 1 norm. For both attack-resilient state estimators, we derive rigorous analytic bounds on the state-estimation errors caused by the presence of noise. Our analysis shows that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise and, thus, the attacker cannot exploit the noise to introduce unbounded state-estimation errors. Finally, we show how the l 0 and l 1 -based attack-resilient state estimators can be used for sound attack detection and identification; we provide conditions on the size of attack vectors that ensure correct identification of compromised sensors.
ally been an afterthought. Yet, with the advance of cyberphysical systems (CPS), the tight interaction between information technology and the physical world has made control components of CPS vulnerable to attack vectors well beyond the standard cyberattacks [1] . In the last few years, several incidents have clearly illustrated susceptibility of CPS to attacks and raised attention to security challenges in these systems. These include attacks on large-scale systems, such as the Maroochy Water breach [2] and the StuxNet virus attack on an industrial supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) system [3] , [4] . In addition, attacks on modern vehicles [5] [6] [7] and the RQ-170 Sentinel U.S. drone that was captured in Iran [8] , [9] show that even widely used, safety-critical automotive and avionics CPS can be compromised by malicious attackers.
A typical CPS contains an internal network, or multiple networks, connected by a gateway to external communications network. In many cases, such as in the automotive industry, systems rely on perimeter security where internal networks are resource constrained, mostly depending on the security of the gateway and external communication channels. However, the gateway may be compromised, becoming a threat to the system's operation [5] , [6] . In addition, some of the internal components might be tampered with, allowing the attacker to access the internal communication network [7] . From the control of the CPS perspective, attacks on the internal network, where the attacker inserts messages anywhere in the sensors-to-controllersto-actuators pathway, can be modeled as additional signals injected into the control loop via system sensors and actuators [10] . While some of these attacks can be avoided with the use of standard cryptographic tools that guarantee data integrity and authentication, this incurs a significant design, computational, and operational overhead for these usually resource-constrained systems.
On the other hand, unlike standard cybersystems, reported CPS vulnerabilities include noninvasive attacks on system sensors, where an adversarial signal is injected into the measured data by modifying a sensor's physical environment. This has been illustrated with several noninvasive attacks on global positioning system (GPS)-based navigation systems [9] , [11] , [12] , and antilock braking systems [13] in vehicles. These attacks show that the use of standard encryption and dataauthentication-based network security techniques does not guarantee secure control of CPS. In such cases, even if the stream of sensor data is properly encrypted, it would still contain incorrect values. Consequently, there is a need to focus on attack-resilient control of CPS, to ensure safety in such scenarios. 2325 -5870 © 2016 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
A. Related Work
In recent years, significant efforts have been invested into the development of control techniques that exploit some knowledge of system dynamics for attack detection and attack-resilient control (e.g., [10] , [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] ). One line of work has focused on attack detection, [19] [20] [21] [22] based on the use of standard residual probability-based detectors (e.g., the chi-square detector). For example, in [19] , the authors illustrate how these detectors can be used to detect integrity attacks on SCADA systems, while in [20] , the authors focus on the design of watermarked control inputs for active attack detection.
In addition to attack detection, the problem of state estimation in the presence of sensor and actuator attacks has attracted significant attention due to the fact that the CPS is capable of correctly estimating the plant's state from corrupted measurements and would be able to continue operating even under attack. For noiseless linear time-invariant (LTI) systems for which the exact plant model is known, the attack-resilient state estimation problem has been formulated as an l 0 optimization problem [15] , [16] . In addition, in [23] , the authors present an SMT-based state estimation technique.
However, it is unclear how robust these state estimators are to noise and modeling errors; specifically, what kind of guarantees can be provided for performance of attack-resilient state estimators for noisy dynamical systems. To the best of our knowledge, the first work on this topic was [24] . In that paper, we introduced an l 0 -based attack-resilient state estimator for systems with bounded noise that can be formulated as a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). We also showed its robustness to noise and modeling errors, and provided a complex design-time procedure to bound the worst-case state estimation error in the presence of attacks.
It is worth noting that our work exploits some of the ideas initially introduced in the domain of compressed sensing (e.g., see [25] and the references within), starting from the problem considered in [26] and [27] where a sparse state was to be extracted for noisy nondynamical systems with a predefined measurement matrix and without any structured interference. These works were extended to the problem of the extraction of block-sparse signals for these systems in the presence of noise (e.g., [28] ). On the other hand, error bounds for the estimation of (nonblock) sparse signals in the presence of structured interference for noisy nondynamical systems have been recently addressed in [29] and [30] . Specifically, [29] considers systems with Gaussian measurement matrices, while [30] provides a very conservative error bound due to the fact that the authors assume that state and interference are sparse.
B. Contributions of This Work
In this paper, we focus on the problem of attack-resilient state estimation for linear dynamical systems with bounded-size noise. We consider the most general model for sensor attacks where any signals can be injected via the compromised sensors [10] . We start from the l 0 -based state estimation procedure introduced in [16] , and show how it can be adapted for systems with noise. The main limitation of the l 0 -based state estimators is that solving them is NP hard in general. Therefore, by exploiting properties of the l 1 norm, we provide a computationally efficient, convex optimization-based state estimation procedure for noisy dynamical systems.
Furthermore, unlike our work in [24] for the l 0 estimator, we derive rigorous analytic bounds on the state-estimation errors for l 0 and l 1 -based state estimation procedures. We show that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise, and when the number of attacked sensors is not higher than a predefined number (that depends on the properties of the system's observability matrix), the attacker cannot exploit noise and modeling errors to introduce unbounded state estimation errors. In addition, we introduce a method that utilizes the presented attack-resilient state estimators for sound attack detection and identification, using the estimates of attack vectors provided by the estimators.
Preliminary versions of some of the results from the paper have been presented in [24] and [31] . This paper is significantly expanded from the conference papers, providing full proofs of all theorems from [31] as well as showing the boundedness of the state estimation error when the l 1 -based estimation procedure is used. In addition, we provide a comprehensive view of the unique challenges for secure control of CPS, and unlike the conference paper, present a thorough evaluation of the stateestimation bounds introduced in this paper.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the problem formulation, while in Section III, we present attack-resilient state estimation procedures based on the l 0 and l 1 norms. In Sections IV and V, we present robustness analysis of the l 0 and l 1 -based state estimators, respectfully. Finally, in Section VI, we show how the presented state estimators can be used for sound attack detection and identification, followed by evaluation of the introduced robustness bounds (Section VII) and some concluding remarks in Section VIII.
C. Notation and Terminology
For a set S, |S| denotes the cardinality (i.e., size) of the set. In addition, for a set K ⊂ S, with K we denote the complement set of K with respect to S, that is K = S \ K.
We use A T to indicate the transpose of matrix A, while the ith element of a vector x k is denoted by x k,i . For vector x and matrix A, we denote by |x| and |A| the vector and matrix whose elements are absolute values of the initial vector and matrix, respectively. Also, for matrices P and Q, by P ≤ Q we specify that the matrix P is element-wise smaller than the matrix Q. In addition, for a symmetric matrix Q, Q 0 denotes that the matrix is positive semidefinite.
We use R to denote the set of reals. In addition, I p denotes the identity matrix of size p, while I(·) denotes the indicator function. Finally, for a vector e ∈ R p , the support of the vector is the set supp(e) = {i | e i = 0} ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , p}, while l 0 norm of vector e is the cardinality of supp(e), that is e l 0 = |supp(e)|. 1 Although the l 0 -norm is not formally a norm, in this paper, we will abuse the terminology and refer to it as a norm in order to use consistent terminology with the one used in previous work on this topic (e.g., [16] ).
II. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
We consider LTI systems of the form
The plant's output vector y ∈ R p contains measurements of the plant's state x ∈ R n provided by p sensors from the set S = {s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s p }. We assume the measurement noise vector w ∈ R p to be bounded; specifically, we assume that |w k | ≤ δ w k , for all k ≥ 0. Finally, the sparse vector e ∈ R p with support in the set K ⊆ S denotes the attack vector injected by a malicious attacker using sensors from the set K. 2 The attack-resilient state estimation problem focuses on reconstruction of the initial system state x 0 from a set of N output observations 3 y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y N −1 . These observations are potentially corrupted by an attacker with access to the sensors from the set K, that is
One additional goal is to provide identification of the compromised sensors (i.e., identify sensors from K), since the actual set K of compromised sensors is not known before the estimation.
A. Model Motivation
The aforementioned attack-resilient state estimation problem can be also used for the general form of LTI systems
Here, A ∈ R n ×n , B ∈ R n ×m , and C ∈ R p×n , while process and measurement noise v p ∈ R n and v m ∈ R p , respectively, are bounded in size. In this general case, to obtain the plant's state at any time step t (i.e., x t ), the goal is to utilize the previous N sensor measurement vectors (y t−N +1 , . . . , y t ) and actuator inputs (u t−N +1 , . . . , u t−1 ) to evaluate the state x t−N +1 .
For dynamical systems without noise, the state can be obtained as the minimization argument of the following optimization problem [16] , [24] 
Here, the matrix
maintains the last N sensor measurements compensated for the impact of the inputs applied during that interval, that is
Finally, linear mapping
x specifies the observed system evolution, due to its dynamics, from initial state x.
Consequently, even for the general form of LTI systems as in (2), the problem of state estimation can be mapped into the state estimation for systems from (1), where control inputs are discarded. Furthermore, as shown in [24] , the bounds on the size of measurement noise in (1) can be related to the bounds on the size of process and measurement noise vectors v p and v m . It is worth noting, however, that these bounds on measurement noise in problem formulation (1), which are caused by the process noise from (2), can be very conservative in the case where the system (i.e., matrix A) is unstable. In general, the transformation of the process and measurement noise bounds from the model (2) to only measurement noise in (1) is conservative since it has to capture the worst-case system (including noise) behavior.
III. ATTACK-RESILIENT STATE ESTIMATORS
We start by introducing the following notation. We use P K to denote the projection from the set S to set K by keeping only rows of C with indices that correspond to sensors from K. Formally,
and i
T j denotes the row vector (of the appropriate size) with a 1 in its jth position being the only nonzero element of the vector. Furthermore, for any sensor s i and set K we define the matrices O s i and O K as
We will also slightly abuse the notation by using O i to denote 
to denote all measurements obtained by the sensor s i and measurement noise at the sensor, respectively, at time steps 0, . . . , N − 1. Hence, we have that for all 1 ≤ i ≤ p:
Finally, we define block vectorsỹ,ẽ,w ∈ R
T . 5 Since each element of the measurement noise vectors w 0 , . . . ,
we denote by Ω ⊂ R pN the feasible set of noise vectorsw. In addition, for any set R ⊂ S, we definew R to be the block vector obtained by concatenatingw s i for all s i ∈ R starting from the smallest i to the largest, while the corresponding Ω R ⊂ R |R|N denotes the feasible set of vectorsw R . We similarly define the matrix O R to be obtained by concatenating matrices O i for all s i ∈ R. Now, from (5), it follows that:
For block vectors obtained by concatenating p vectors, such asẽ andỹ, we also use the notation from [28] 
Note that for any block vectorẽ it holds that ẽ l 2 ,l 0 = ẽ l t ,l 0 for any t ≥ 1. This allows us to define block q-sparse vector e as a vector that satisfies ẽ l 2 ,l 0 = q, meaning that it has q nonzero subvectors. Hence, if the set of compromised sensors K has q elements (i.e., |K| = q), then vectorẽ is q-block sparse. Using the above notation, the optimization problem (3) can be represented as
Now, consider the measurement vectorỹ for a noiseless system's (i.e., when Ω = 0 ∈ R pN ) evolution due to the initial state x 0 and attack vectorẽ * . If the number of attacked sensors q = |K| is not higher than a certain number q max , 6 The minimization arguments of the problem P 0 are exactly the initial state x 0 and the attack vectorẽ * [16] . Thus, in this case, the estimator P 0 also correctly identifies the set of attacked sensors K. Furthermore, for noiseless systems, P 0 is optimal in the sense that if another estimator can recover the initial state (which would also result in identification of the attacked sensors), the attack-resilient state estimator based on P 0 can as well [16] .
On the other hand, P 0 cannot be used when noisy sensor measurements are available (i.e., when Ω = 0 ∈ R pN ). For instance, in this case, the point (x 0 ,ẽ * ) might not even be feasible. Thus, there is need to adapt problem P 0 to nonideal models that capture system noise. To achieve this, we consider the following problem that relaxes the equality constraint from (8) by 5 The matrix O is obtained by reordering rows of the standard observability matrix for the system (A, C) and, thus, it has the same rank as the observability matrix. 6 The number q m ax depends on the properties of the observability matrix of the system. We will address this in more detail in Section IV.
including a noise allowance:
The problem P 0,ω involves combinatorial optimization that can be solved using MILP solvers. However, solving P 0,ω is NP-hard in the general case, which limits its use on smaller size systems. A common approach used in compressed sensing is to replace the l 0 norm by the l 1 norm, which effectively convexifies the problem and reduces its computational requirements. Consequently, to perform the attack-resilient state estimation, we also consider the following optimization problem:
However, it is unclear what guarantees can be provided regarding the performance of the attack-resilient state estimators P 0,ω and P 1,ω . Specifically, we are interested in obtaining worstcase bounds on the state estimation errors caused by noise and attacks on sensors, and answering the question whether the attacker can exploit the noise to introduce an unbounded state estimation error. We will also investigate conditions that ensure that the presented state estimators can be used to correctly identify the set of attacked sensors.
IV. PERFORMANCE GUARANTEES FOR P 0,ω ESTIMATOR In this section, we focus on the performance degradation of the P 0,ω state estimator due to the existence of noise. Specifically, we are interested in providing bounds on Δx l 0 that is defined as
We will also denote ith blocks of
We consider systems where the number of compromised sensors q = |K| is not higher than q max -the maximal number of attacked sensors for which the system's state can be recovered in the noiseless case. Thus, before we proceed with our analysis, we first characterize conditions under which it is possible to perform the state estimation even for noiseless systems. We start with the following definition.
Definition 1 [32] : An LTI system with the form as in (1) is said to be s-sparse observable if for every set K ⊂ S of size s (i.e., |K| = s), the pair (A, P K C) is observable.
From the analysis in [16] , the following holds. Lemma 1: q max is equal to the maximal s for which the system is 2s-sparse observable.
For considered systems, the following theorem provides a bound on the maximal state estimation error caused by the existence of noise. 
where r 1 holds because ẽ * l 2 ,l 0 = q and the number of attacked sensors q is bounded by q max .
From (6), we have thatẽ * =ỹ − Ox 0 −w * . Similarly, from the constraint (9) it follows that:ẽ l 0 =ỹ − Ox l 0 ,ω −w l 0 , which implies
Here, Δw =w l 0 −w * , withw l 0 ,w * ∈ Ω. Therefore, from (14) and (15), there exists an, at most, 2q maxsparse block vectorz ∈ R pN (z = −Δẽ l 0 ) with, at most, 2q max nonzero N -size blocks (since z l 2 ,l 0 ≤ 2q max )-such that 
. , s i f ). Hence, we have
where
R ,w * R ∈ Ω R . Note that the set R has f = p − 2q max elements, and since the system is 2q max -sparse observable (from Lemma 1), the pair (A, P R C) is observable (and f ≥ 1). Thus, the matrix O R is full (column) rank and we can define the pseudoinverse matrix
, from which it follows that:
Note that although l 0 is not convex (and thus not a norm), it satisfies the triangular inequality.
we have that (13) is satisfied, which concludes the proof. It is important to highlight that the bound on the right-hand side of (13) is linear in the size of noise. Furthermore, the above theorem states that if, at most, q max sensors have been compromised, the attacker cannot exploit the noise to introduce an unbounded state estimation error. Another thing to consider is the complexity of computing the term in (13) . To determine the state estimation bound, we need to check p p−2q m a x different subsets R of the set S, and for each R compute
where λ O † R max denotes the largest singular value of O † R , and
for Ω R defined as in Section III. 8 This is significantly lower than the required computational cost for the robustness analysis from [24] .
Finally, it is worth noting that for almost all systems (i.e., for almost all pairs of matrices A, C), we have that q max = p/2 − 1 [16] , meaning that 1 ≤ p − 2q max ≤ 2. Thus, for almost all systems, to obtain the bound, we would need to evaluate the above term for either p or p(p − 1)/2 sets R only.
V. ROBUSTNESS OF P 1,ω ESTIMATOR TO NOISE
In this section, we provide a bound on the error of the P 1,ω estimator due to noise. We start by introducing notation similar to the one used in the previous section:
Specifically, we are interested in obtaining a bound on Δx l 1 . Theorem 2: When sensors from set K ⊂ S are attacked, state estimation error Δx l 1 satisfies the following constraint
where σ Ω = maxw ∈Ω w l 2 ,l 1 . Proof 2: Sinceẽ l 1 is a minimizer of the problem P 1,ω , it follows that ẽ l 1 l 2 ,l 1 ≤ ẽ * l 2 ,l 1 . Thus, to find a bound on the Δẽ l 1 we consider a set that contains all feasible Δẽ l 1 , which is defined as:
By starting from the the above feasibility condition, it follows that:
Here, r 1 is satisfied by the fact that only sensors from the set K are attacked-i.e., all other blocks of the attack vector e * are zero. Relation r 2 follows from the fact that a + b ≥ a − b , for any a, b. Thus, the set from (20) can be overapproximated by the set
From (5), we have thatẽ *
Hence, the constraint from the set definition in (21) can be represented as:
Again, using properties of norms we have
and thus, from (23) it follows that the set constraint from (21) can be additionally relaxed to
9 In this paper, when a norm is not clearly specified we imply that a statement is valid for any norm. where
which concludes the proof.
Remark 1: Proposition 6 from [16] states that P 1,ω can correctly estimate the state for noiseless systems (Ω = 0) if and only if for all K such that |K| = q, it holds that:
This means that (19) is tight for noiseless systems, since for Ω = 0 (19) takes the form
this constraint when combined with (25) implies that for noiseless systems Δx l 1 = 0, meaning that the state is correctly reconstructed.
Finally, if we consider systems that can deal with up to q attacks when there is no noise, from (19) and (25) it follows that the feasible set for the state estimation vector Δx l 1 can be described as the set where Δx l 1 = 0 or it satisfies
for all K ⊂ S, such that |K| = q. Now, consider any vector v ∈ R n . From (25) , there exists > 0 such that 2 , and thus all vectors of the form αv, where α ∈ (0, 2σ Ω / ] satisfy (26) , while for all α > 2σ Ω / , αv does not belong to the feasibility region (26) . This implies that starting from 0 and moving in any direction, a point will be reached after which all new points along that direction do not satisfy (26) . Therefore, when the condition (25) for correct estimation for noiseless systems is satisfied, then there exists a bounded solution of (26)-i.e., the maximal state estimation error Δx l 1 is bounded. Finally, it is worth noting that the condition (25) corresponds to the Null-Space Property commonly used in compressed sensing literature. When (25) holds, if Δx l 1 is the maximization point for noise level σ Ω , then for noise levelσ Ω = kσ Ω , k > 0, error vector kΔx l 1 satisfies (19) for the new noise levelσ Ω . The scaled vector is also a maximization point of the new problem (with noise levelσ Ω ), since otherwise there would exist a state error vector with a larger l 2 norm for the initial problem (with noise level σ Ω ). Consequently, in this case, the estimation error bound obtained by maximization of Δx l 1 2 over the set described by (19) depends linearly on the size of the noise.
From the relationship between l 2 and l 1 norms where
it follows that O i Δx
The above inequalities along with Theorem 2 prove the following corollary.
Corollary 1: When sensors from set K ⊂ S are attacked, the state estimation error Δx l 1 satisfies
where σ Ω = maxw ∈Ω w l 2 ,l 1 . Both conditions from Theorem 2 and Corollary 1 define sets that contain all feasible Δx l 1 when less than or equal to q sensors are attacked; the case where q 1 < q sensors are attacked is covered by the scenario where |K| = q sensors are compromised, but q − q 1 sensors are inserting zero signals. However, maximization problems over these sets may be hard to solve in the general case. Thus, we introduce the following theorem that for a special class of systems provides an analytic formula for
for some λ > 0. Then if at most q nodes are compromised the following condition holds:
Proof 3: We start by assuming that the set of compromised sensors K has q elements. From (28) and (27) it follows that
Let's denote
Then, it holds that for Δx l 1 = 0:
Here, r 1 holds due to (29) , while r 2 is caused by the fact that Ax l 2 ≤ A l 2 x l 2 for any matrix A and vector x.
Therefore, from (31) and (32),
which implies (30) . On the other hand, consider a set K 1 ⊂ S with |K 1 | < q. If (29) is satisfied for all K with exactly q sensors, then it also holds for K 1 . This case is also covered by the scenario where q sensors including the sensors from K 1 are compromised, while the injected attack signals on q − |K 1 | sensors that are not in K 1 are equal to zero. The error signal in this case satisfies (30) , although effectively only |K 1 | < q are used to inject attacks, which concludes the proof.
Although Theorem 3 provides an analytic bound for the worst-case state estimation error obtained by P 1,ω for a certain class of systems, it is worth noting that it could heavily overapproximate the error due to the gains caused by the conversions between the norms (i.e., factor √ qN ). Still, along with Theorem 2 and Corollary 1, it provides the first analytic relation showing that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise, as in the case for the P 0,ω estimator.
Finally, when N = 1, the state estimation does not consider previous sensor measurements-i.e., only sensor measurements from the current time-step are taken into account. Thus, in this case, any knowledge of the system's dynamics is not utilized, and the problem if effectively mapped into the problem of estimating the state of a non-dynamical system from a single set of potentially compromised sensor measurements. This problem has drawn considerable attention in some CPS domains, mainly in the smart-grids community (e.g., [33] ). In this case, the sufficient condition (29) for the analytic bound (30) from Theorem 3 can be specified as
for some λ > 0. In addition to considerably reducing the conservativeness of (30) for N = 1, the condition from (34) is significantly less restrictive, which enables the use of the bound (30) (where N = 1) for a large class of systems.
VI. ATTACK IDENTIFICATION IN PRESENCE OF NOISE
In addition to computing a state estimate, the presented attackresilient state estimation procedures also estimate attack vectors injected at time steps k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1 (i.e., vectorsẽ l t , t = 0, 1). Thus, in this section we consider conditions for which the attack vectors estimates can be used for sound identification of compromised sensors; here, by sound identification we refer to methods that ensure that no uncompromised (i.e., valid) sensors would be identified as under attack. To simplify the notation, we will use the l t notation (instead of l 0 or l 1 ) whenever we describe results that hold for both P 0,ω and P 1,ω obtained estimates.
An obvious candidate for identification procedure would be to use the policy that classifies sensor s i as attacked if and only if I(ẽ l t i = 0). Note that, unless we can guarantee that the set of identified attacked sensors is a subset of the actual set of attacked sensors K (which is not known in advance), we cannot
VII. EVALUATION
To evaluate conservativeness of the state-estimation error bounds presented in this work, we exploit the evaluation approach from [24] . We randomly generated 100 systems with n = 10 states and p = 5 sensors, and 100 systems with n = 20 states and p = 11 sensors. Each of these systems had measurement models satisfying that the rows of the C matrix have unit magnitude, while all noise-bound vectors δ w k , k ≥ 0, had elements between 0 and 2. For each of the generated 200 systems, with 10 or 20 states, we evaluated the state-estimation error Δx l 0 in 1000 experiments for various attack and noise realizations, where the number of attacked sensors was less than or equal to 2 for the systems with p = 5 sensors, and less than or equal to 5 for systems with p = 11 sensors, while noise realizations were bounded by the noise bounds specified by the system's δ w k .
The focus of our evaluation was the comparison between the state-estimation bounds and the observed state estimation errors due to the presence of noise. In both simulations and calculations of the error bounds we considered the case when the window size N is equal to the number of system states (i.e., N = n). The results of our evaluation are presented in Figs. 1 and 2 . Figs. 1(a) and 2(a) present histograms of Δx l 0 errors for all 1000 attack scenarios for two randomly selected system with n = 10 and n = 20 states. As can be seen, the bound from Theorem 1 is an order of magnitude larger than the average state-estimation error for each system. Furthermore, we investigated the ratio between the worst-case observed state estimation error for all 1000 simulations of each system S-i.e., max i=1:1000 Δx l 0 S 2 , and the system's error bounds D
Histograms of the relative errors for both types of systems are shown in Fig. 1 (b) and 2(b). As can be observed, the maximal observed state estimation error reaches 16% of the computed bound for smaller systems (n = 10 states), while for larger systems (with n = 20 states) the maximal relative error reaches 1.5% of the computed bounds. Conservativeness of the presented results was partially caused by the fact that we only simulated random initial points and random attack vectors, where sensor attacks are generated independently for each attacked sensor and noise profiles. As a result, the considered scenarios clearly do not capture worst-case attacks (i.e., attacks that could maximize the state estimation errors); for each system, to obtain scenarios that result in the worst-case estimation errors it is necessary to derive the corresponding attack vectors (and the initial states), which is beyond the scope of this paper.
This has been highlighted in the discrepancy of the relative estimation errors for systems with different size, as illustrated in the histograms in Figs. 1(b) and 2(b) . While simulating different attack and noise realizations, we observed that the obtained maximal relative estimation error reduces with an increase in p = 9, n = 1 q m a x = 4 100% p = 9, n = 2 q m a x = 3 70.4% p = 9, n = 3 q m a x = 3 17.8% p = 9, n = 4 q m a x = 2 0.4%
with n = 10 states, the maximal relative error was 20%. On the other hand, the complexity of the error bounding algorithm from [24] limits its use to systems with smaller number of states, while the bound from Theorem 1 can be computed for systems with n = 20 states and p = 11 sensors in seconds. Finally, we evaluate how often the condition from (34) is satisfied, which allows for the use of the very computationally efficient bounding procedure (30) for the l 1 -based state estimators. We considered random systems with p = 9 sensors and a different number of states n. For each type of systems (i.e., n and p) we randomly generated 1000 systems and for each system we checked if there exists α > 0 such that (34) is satisfied. Table I summarizes the results; for reference, in the table we also specify the value for q max -the maximal number of compromised sensors for which the state can be always recovered for systems without noise and any (optimal) state estimator (e.g., l 0 -based estimator). As can be seen, with the increase in the number of states, the percentage of systems for which the bound (30) can be used significantly decreases. This has been caused by the fact that with the increase in n, the values for q max decrease, meaning that even l 0 -based estimator can deal with a lower number of compromised sensors. Furthermore, for these systems the worst-case recorded relative error was 2 · 10 −4 . As described in Section V, the reason for the heavy overapproximations are the use of l 1 -based convexification and the conversions between the norms. While this paper provides the first analytic bound for l 1 -based state estimation and shows that the worst-case error is linear with the size of the noise, an avenue for future work will be to provide a tighter bound for the convex-optimization based approach to attack-resilient state estimation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have considered the problem of state estimation when some of the sensors are attacked by a malicious attacker. Unlike existing work on this topic, we have investigated the case when there is bounded-size noise in the system's dynamics. We have shown how to use two estimators that incorporate noise allowance in its constraints (i.e., P 0,ω and P 1,ω ) and proved that the worst-case state estimation error is linear with the size of the noise present in the system. The provided bounds illustrate that l 0 based state estimation results in significantly more accurate state estimation. However, the penalty is paid in the complexity of the procedure-P 0,ω can be solved as a mixed integer linear program, which are NP hard in general, while P 1,ω can be efficiently solved using standard convex solvers and is more suited for embedded control applications.
Finally, we have derived attack identification procedures, based on these estimators, that exploit the fact that besides state estimates, estimations of attack vectors are also provided. We have shown that the proposed attack identification schemes are sound, and derived conditions on signals injected via an attacked sensor that would guarantee identification of the compromised sensor. An avenue for future work would be to determine conditions when the support of estimated attack vectors is a subset of the set of attacked vectors.
